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PEOPI.JE, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF
MAHIN COUN'rY, Respondent; CARYL CHESSMAN,
Real Party in Interest.

[1] Habeas Corpus- Function of Writ.-]'unction of writ of
habeas corpus is solely to el1cct "discharge" from unlawful
restraint, though illegality in respect to which discharge from
restraint is sought may not go to fact of continued detention
hut may be simply as to circumstances under which prisoner
is held, as, for example, where he questions propriety of his
detention as habitual criminal or where he questions construction of judgment of conYiction under which he is held.
[2] !d.-Hearing-Scope of Inquiry.-Scope of inquiry at hearing
on writ of habeas corpus includes consideration of any fact to
show either that petitioner's imprisonment or detention is unlawful or that he is entitled to his discharge. (Pen. Code,
§ 1484.)

[1] Sec Cal.Jur., Habeas Corpus, § 2; Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus,
§ 2.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Habeas Corpus, § 2; [2, 9] Habeas
Corpus, § 59; [3] Habeas Corpus, § 65; [ 4] Habeas Corpus, § 73;
Habeas Corpus,§ 74; [6-8, 10, 11] Habeas Corpus, § 38.
(1)
44 C.2d-1

on h11beas
from
all restraint.
Id.-Appeal-By Whom Taken.-~·The
may maintain an
from order in habeas corpus
that prisoner
"tontinue to he nllowed tltt' freu ext'rtise" of nsserted
m
with his
of
although
offieiuls are named as rl'spondents
for such
is found in
which provides that
may be taken
certain orders on
corpus.
!d.-Certiorari-Availability of Writ.-Writ of certiorari will
not lie to review habeas corpus order of superior court where
remedy of appeal is available. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1068.)
!d.-Privileges of Person Rightfully in Custody.-Writ of
habeas corpus may he allowed to one lawfully in custody as
means of enforcing rights to which, in his confinement, he is
entitled, such as right to file in court a petition or other document which purports to seek some remedy or relief relating to
offense for which he is imprisoned, and right, at reasonable
times, to consult
with his counsel in preparation for
trial.
!d.-Privileges of Persons Rightfully in Custody.-Prisoner
was not deprived of
to access of courts and to consult
counsel so as to entitle him to relief by habeas corpus where,
aside from fact that warden temporarily took erroneous position that he could refuse to permit filing of petition for habeas
corpus, no violation of any right to which prisoner is entitled
was made to appear, where prisoner's temporary separation
from his papers was shown to have been an incident of his
punishment for violation of reasonable prison rule against
ereation of loud disturbances, and where refusal to permit
him to see counsel was shown to have been based on reasonable
ground that such counsel was not his attorney.
!d.-Privileges of Persons Rightfully in Custody.-Prisoner's
decision to represent himself in judicial proceeding does not
entitle him to greater privilPges than other prisoners.
Id.-Hearing-Dismissal.-vYhere it appears at hearings on
prisoner's petition for habeas corpus that he is not then being
deprived of rights to which he is entitled, superior court
should grant the People's motion to dismiss.
"u'u".cu

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

~

f 6] See Cal.Jur., Habeas Corpus, § 6; Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus,
113.
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!d.-Privileges of Persons Rightfully in Custody.--Allowing
"immediate access by mail to the courts . . . at all
" is not an enforceable right.

!d.-Privileges of Persons Rightfully in Custody.-Prisoners
have right to prompt and timely access to mails for purpose
of
to courts statements of fact which attempt to
for
but
have no
enforceresearch.

APPEAL from order made in habeas corpus proceeding
of
to access to courts
and to consult
and PHOCEEDING in certiorari to
review and annul such order. Thomas F. Keating, Judge.
Order reversed with directions; writ of certiorari discharged
and review proceeding dismissed.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn,
Assistant Attorney General, and Charles E. MeClung, Deputy
Attorney General, for Appellant in Crim. No. 5591, and for
Petitioner in S. F. No. 19158.
Caryl Chessman, in pro. per., and Rosalie Asher for Respondent on appeal in Crim. No. 5591 and for Real Party in
Interest in S. F. No. 19158.
No apprarance for respondent in S. F. No. 19158.
SCHAUER, J.-By a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
filed on Oetober 17, 1951, Caryl Chessman, an inmate of San
Quentin State Prison whose appeal from 17 judgments of
conviction was pending, sought relief from allegedly illegal
conditions of imprisonment which assertedly interfered with
his representation of himsel£. 1 On December 18, 1951, this
court affirmed the judgments, two of which imposed the death
penalty. (People v. Chessman, 38 Cal.2d 166 [238 P.2d
1001].) The subject matter of Chessman's petition for habeas
corpns has no relevancy whatsoever to the proceedings at the
trial which resulted in his eonviction or to the legality of the
judgments which were imposed and affirmed and under which
he is now confined and awaiting execution; it relates solely
'Petitioner continued to represent himself in these proceedings until
8, 1954, when Mr. Berwyn Rice was appointed to represent
him. On November 24, at Chessman's request, the appointment of
Mr. Rice was terminaterl. At oral argument Miss Rosalie Asher
appeared for Chessman.
~ ovemher

4
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to a matter of prison administration. After the judgments
had been affirmed the superior
in the habeas corpus
proceeding, ordered that Chessman ''continue to be allowed
the free exercise'' of asserted rights in connection with his
representation of himself. The attorney general filed with
the District Court of
a notiee of appeal from the
superior court order; also, uncertain whether the People could
appeal from the order, the
filed with the
District Court of Appeal a petition for a writ of ndew. 'rhe
District Court of Appeal issned the writ of review. The
matters have been transferred to this court, and Chessman
has filed notices of motion to dismiss the reYiew proceeding
and the appeal. ~We have conelmlecl, for reasons hereinafter
stated, that the order appealed from should be reversed with
directions to the superior court to dismiss the habeas corpus
proceeding, and that the review proceeding should be dismissed.
AppealabiWy of the Habeas Corpus Order
The principal ground of Chessman's motion to dismiss the
appeal is that the superior court order is not appealable.
The People have asked that this court pass on the question
whether they can appeal from an order on habeas corpus
which directs that a petitioner be granted relief but which
does not order his release from enstody.
In accord with the view that "The right of appeal is derived
from our constitution or statutes" (Gale v. 'l'nolwnne County
~Water· Co. (1914), 169 Cal. 46, ii2 [H5 P. 532] ), prior to the
enactment of section 1506 of the Penal Code in 1927 it was
held that no orders on habeas corpus were appealable. (lJ!Iaiter
of Perkins (1852), 2 Cal. 424, 430; People v. Schuster (1871),
40 Cal. 627; Matter of Hughes (1911), 159 Cal. 360,363
[113 P. 684]; 1lfatto· of Zany (1913), ]64 Cal. 724, 727 [130
P. 710]; F'mnce v. S11perior Court (1927), 201 Cal. 122, 127
[255 P. 815, 52 A.L.R. 869]; Ex parte White (1906), 2 Cal.
App. 726, 727 [84 P. 242].) Section 1506 of the Penal Code,
as enacted in 1927, provided insofar as is here material that
''An appeal may be taken . . . by the people from a final
order of a suprrior court ma(le upon the return of a writ of
habeas corpus discharging a defendant after his conviction,
in all criminal eases prosecuted by indictment or information
in a court of reeO'"fl. . . . " 'fhere followed a series of eases
which announced that the People eould appeal only in those
eases which came within the precise wording of the statute
and refused to allow an appeal where the habeas corpus order
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made after conviction in a criminal case prosecuted
indictment or information.
re Alpine (1928), 203 Cal.
58 A.L.ll. 1500); ln 1·e Bruegger (1928),
P. 101] ; Thuesen v. S~tperior Cotlrt
), 210 Cal.
576 [12 P.2d 8); Lonstalot v. Superior
) , 30 Ca1.2d
913 [186 P.2d 673] ; ln re Merwin
, 108
31, 32 [290 P. 1076] ; ln re Dutton
(1931), 119 Cal.App. 447, 448 [6 P.2d 558].)
in the last cited eases the court would not allow
the People
where there was literal comrequirements that there be "convic" in a case
"by indictment or information,"
Jiberal vieT\' as to the meaning of the word "discharging"
section 1506 was taken in In re Larabee (1933), 131 Cal.
261, 264
P.2d 132]. •rherc an imnate of San Quenconfined pursuant to a judgment of conviction in Los
County, sought habeas corpus in Marin County.
the superior court order in the habeas corpus proceeding
nnnTHHlOT' was ''remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of
I.~os Angeles County.'' The People appealed. Petitioner moved
dismiss the appeal on the ground that the order was not,
in the language of section 1506 of the Penal Code, one
"discharging" him. In denying the motion to dismiss, the
appellate court said that the effect of the order was to discharge the petitioner from the custody of the warden, and the
fact that the superior court also ordered petitioner remanded
to the custody of the sheriff ''did not have the effect of
depriving the state of its right of appeal, for the reason that
iu the face of a valid commitment the trial court was without
po>Yer to make such order."
In 1951 section 1506 of the Penal Code was amended to
that "An appeal may be taken . . . by the people
from a final order of a superior court made upon the return
of a writ of habeas corpus discharging a defendant after his
conviction in all criminal cases. . . . '' It is Chessman's
position that the order here is not appealable because it is not
one "discharging" him. The People argue that as the uses
of habeas corpus have been extended by judicial decision to
the granting to prisoners of rights short of effecting their
release from Hlegal custody, there should be a concomitant
extension of appealability to orders effecting these new uses
of the \\Tit. [1] The function of the writ of habeas corpus
is solely to effect "discharge" from unlawful restraint, though
tlw illrgalit.r in respect to which tlJC discharge from restraint

go i o tJw far:t of
to the c:iremnstam~es

but
which the
1s
the proof his detention as an habitual criminal (In re JlcVickers (1946), 29 CaL2d 264 [ 176 P.2d
; In re Seeley
( 1946), 29 Cal.2d 294, 299 [17 6 P .2d
; In re H arincar
, 29 Cal.2d 403
In re
),
:30 Cal.2d 20 [180 P.2d
In re Pearson (1947), ilO CaL2c1
871
P.2d 401]) or where he questions the construction
of the judgment of conviction under which he is held
Br·arnble ( 1947), 31 Cal.2d
51 tl87 P .2d 411] ) . "
person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his liberty,
under any pretense
may
a writ of habeas
corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or
restraint." (Pen. Code, § 1473.) [2, 3] The scope of inquiry at the hearing on the writ includes consideration of
''any fact to show either that his imprisonment or detention
is unlawful, or that he is entitled to his discharge" (Pen.
Code, § 1484) and "If no legal cause is shown for snch
imprisonment or restraint, or for the continuation thereof,
. . . [the] court or judge must discharge such party from
the custody or restraint under which he is held" (Pen. Code,
§ 1485), which means that the prisoner may be discharged
from illegal conditions of restraint although not from all
restraint. Since this is the function and scope of habeas
corpus, we conclude that it is proper and desirable to interprrt
section 1506 of the Penal Code in its use of the word ''discharging" as being fully as broad as the scope of the writ
itself.
The People as Parties to the Appeal
[4] It is Chessman's position that the appeal should be
dismissed because the People are not parties vdw can maintain
such appeal. The People are not named as respondents ill
the petition for habeas corpus; the respondents there named
are the warden, two assistant wardens, and the chief custody
ofiicer of San Quentin. However, authority for an appeal in
the name of the People is found in section 1506 of the Penal
Code which since its enactment has provided that an appeal
may be taken "by the people" from certain orders on habeas
corpus.

Availab1:lity of Certiorari to Review Superior
Court Habeas Corpus Order
[5] In support of his motion to dismiss the writ of certiorari Chessman contends that such writ will not lie to
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an order of the superior court on habeas corpus, no
matter how erroneous it may be, if the superior court had
"jurisdiction," citing Matter
Hughes ( 1911), supra, 159
Cal. 360, 363. (See also Rose v. SupeTior Court (1948), 86
173, 176 [194 P.2d 568].) However, we need not
this time reexamine the rationale of the Hughes case, or
consider the grounds of dismissal urged by Chessman, because it follows as a matter of law from our conclusion
that the
of
is available, that the writ of certiorari will not lie
Civ. Proc., § 1068), and, having
been inadvertently issued, it will be discharged and the proceeding will be dismissed (see 1rlatter of Hughes (1911),
supra, 159 Cal. 360, 366; Rose v. Super·ior Court (1948).
supra, 86 Cal.A pp.2d 173, 178).
The MeTits of the Superior Court Order
The original petition for habeas corpus dated October 3,
1951, alleges in pertinent part that Chessman has appeared
and desires to continue to appear in his own behalf in his
then pending appeal, and that he anticipates unjustifiable
punishment, "depriving him of the use of books, typewriter,
etc., on the pretext that he has violated a prison rule by
helping another man prepare a legal document." A supplement to the petition, dated October 7, 1951, alleges that the
vYarden refused to have the original petition mailed to the
superior court for filing; he returned it to Chessman with a
notation that "I note that you anticipate that you are to
receive some sort of punishment. I do not believe that any
of us can look into the future and determine what will happen.
I also note that you do not tell the truth throughout the petition." A further supplement, dated October 10, 1951, alleges
that Chessman ''is now confined in a 'hole' cell,'' denied thr
use of "clerical supplies or legal books," and "has only a
few sheets of this paper and pen." The petition and the two
supplements were filed on October 17, 1951.
The writ issued and pnrsuant to its command Chessman
was produced before the superior court; respondent warden
filed a return and moved that the matter be dismissed. Chessmen filed a traverse to the return in which he asked that the
petition stand as partial traverse and averred that the prison
authorities ''continue to treat petitioner in such a way . . .
as to deprive petitioner of his legal right effectively to litigate
his case through the courts.''
Chessman, although under sentence of death, personally appeared at six hearings in the superior court between October

8
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and March 7, 1952. The following facts were established: The delay in the filing of the original petition was
clue to the fact that the warden sent it to the attorney general
with a request for advice as to whether he should mail it to
the court for filing; the attorney general advised that the
warden should permit its filing. On October 9, 1951, the
prison disciplinary committee found that Chessman had violated a prison rule by aiding another inmate and punished
him by a reprimand; also on October 9, 1951, Chessman
crrated a loud disturbance and for this he was summarily
punished by confinement in a "quiet cell," without typewriter, books, or his papers, from October 10 to 15, 1951.
On October 16, 1951, the disciplinary committee found Chessman guilty of disorderly conduct and he was punished by
confinement to his own cell for 10 days. On October 26,
1951, Chessman first appeared in the superior court in the
habeas corpus matter, the facilities which had been given him
in connection with his representation of himself had been
restored to him, and he admitted that the question of the
deprivation of such facilities "in the abstract . . . is moot."
During the course of the hearings Chessman wrote to Mr.
Garry, attorney of record for another prisoner, that he wished
to see Mr. Garry; Mr. Garry called at the prison to talk with
his client, then asked to see Chessman; an assistant warden
informed Mr. Garry that he could not see Chessman because
he was not attorney of record for him. Mr. Garry sat with
Chessman at the counsel table as "legal advisor" during one
of the hearings on the habeas corpus matter.
The superior court ordered that the warden's motion to
dismiss be denied and that Chessman "be remanded to the
custody of the \Varden . . . with directions that the said
Petitioner continue to be allowed the free exercise of the
following legal and constitutional rights:
"(1) That the said Petitioner be allowed immediate access
by mail to the courts of this State and of the United States
at all times;
"(2) That the said Petitioner be allowed to make all reasonably necessary legal research for, and to prepare and file with
any such court, any document he deems necessary to the
maintenance of protection of his civil rights or to the effective
representation of himself on appeal from, or in collaterally
attacking, any or all of those judgments of conviction under
which the Respondent \Varden derives his legal authority to
hold the said Petitioner in custody.

1955]
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That the said Petitioner be allowed to retain his
legal papers and books at all times during which
he may reasonably make use of them for the purposes hereinabove set forth.
That while so representing himself on appeal or in
collaterally attacking any or all of those said judgments of
conviction, the said Petitioner should be allowed privately
to consult with attorne.rs of his own choosing and to consult
and communicate with other responsible persons, so long as
the said Petitioner and those who confer with him at the
or communicate with him upon legal matters comply
with the Rules and Regulations of the Prison respecting such
activities.''
[6] The writ of habeas corpus has been allowed to one
lawfully in custody as a means of enforcing rights to which,
in his confinement, he is entitled. It has been held that a
prisoner is entitled to, and habeas corpus is available to
enforce, "the right to file in any court a petition or other
doeument which purports to seek some remedy or relief relating to the offense for which he was imprisoned" (In re Robinson (1952), 112 Cal.App.2d 626, 629 [246 P.2d 982]; In re
lllalone (1952), 112 CaLApp.2d 631 [246 P.2d !)84]; see
Ex parte Hull (1941), 312 U.S. 546, 549 [61 S.Ct. 640, 85
fLEd. 1034]) and petitioner's right, at reasonable times, to
consult privately ·with his counsel in preparation for trial
re Ricler (1920), 50 CaLApp. 797, 799 [195 P. 965);
In re Snyder (1923), 62 Cal.App. 697, 699 [217 P. 777];
In 1·e Qualls (1943), 58 Cal.App.2d 330, 331 [136 P.2d 341]).
[7] The present order eannot be upheld as one enforcing
such rights, for at the time of the hearings and the making
of the order Chessman was not being deprived of those rights.
The petition for habeas corpus had been filed and the delay
preceding its filing was no longer a ground for complaint.
Aside from the fact that the warden temporarily took the
erroneous position that he could refuse to permit the filing
of the petition for habeas corpus, no violation of any right
to which a prisoner is entitled was made to appear. The
temporary separation of Chessman from his papers was shown
to have been an incident of punishment for his violation of a
reasonable prison rule against the creation of loud disturbances. The refusal to permit him to see Mr. Garry was
shown to have been based on the reasonable ground that Mr.
Garry was not his attorney. [8] It is manifest from the

IN HE CHES8?.1AN

C.2tl

record of this habeas corpus
man is
not
but
court which tried him and this court
occasion to point out, Chessman's decision to represent himself did not entitle him to greater
than other
prisoners. (See People v. Chessman (1951), supra, 38 Cal.2d
166, 173-174, 176.)
[9] When it developed at the hearings that Chessman
was not then being
of rights to which he as a
prisoner was entitled, the superior court should have
the People's motion to dismiss. Instead it made an order
which purports to declare that Chessman ''continue to be
allowed'' privileges which are not enforceable rights of prisoners. [10] :B~or example, it would be manifestly impossible
to allow prisoners ''immediate access by mail to the courts
. . . at all times." [11] As indicated above, prisoners
have the right to prompt and timely access to the mails for
the purpose of transmitting to the courts statements of facts
whieh attempt to show any ground for relief, but they have
no legally enforeeable rights to engage in legal research. 2
Sinee it has not been shown that Chessman was being deprived
of any rights at the time of the making of the superior court
order, and since that order purports to declare that he is to
be allowed future privileges to which he is not entitled, the
order cannot be upheld.
For the reasons above stated, the motions of Chessman are
denied; the writ of review is discharged and the review proceeding is dismissed; the order on habeas corpus is reversed
and the cause on habeas corpus is remanded to the superior
court with directions that the writ be discharged, the petitioner be remanded to the custody of the warden, and the
proceeding be dismissed. Let the remittiturs issue forthwith.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Spence, ,J., concurred.
Edmonds, J., and 'rraynor, J., eoncurred in the judgment.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I see no occasion for reading words into section 1506 of
the Penal Code which makes appealable only an order of the
"''A person sentenced to death is deemed civilly dead during the
existence of the death sentence.'' (Pen. Code, § 2602.) Also, because
Chessman is under sentence to life imprisonment he is deemed civilly
dead (Pen. Code, § 2601) and because he is under sentence to imprison·
ment for terms less than life his civil rights are suspended (Pen. Code,
§ 2600).

.B'eb. 1955)
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court which discharges petitioner from custody. It
has been held repeatedly that in only those situations expressly
covered by section 1506 was an order in habeas corpus procccuu•"'" appealable becanse the rule prior to its enactment
had been that the state could not appeal. (In re Alpine,
203 CaL 731
P. 947, 58 A.L.R. 1500]; In re Bruegger,
204 Cal. 169 [267 P. 101] ; Thuesen v. Superior Court, 215 Cal.
572 [12 P.2d
; Loustalot v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.2d 905
[186 P.2d 673); In re Merwin, 108 Cal.App. 31 [290 P. 1076];
In re Dutton, 119 Cal.App. 447 [6 P.2d 558] .) The Bruegger
case states the reason for the rule: ''The primary purpose
of the writ of habeas corpus is to provide a summary and
speedy mode of inquiring into the legality of imprisonment
or restraint . . . the writ would be deprived of its effect if
an order made pursuant to the inquiry can be suspended, and
the person or parties affected can be compelled to undergo
the delay attendant upon an appeal to the higher court.''
(Emphasis added; In re Bntegger, supra, 204 Cal. 169, 171.)
The use of the word "discharge" in section 1506 is plain
enough. It can mean only one thing, release from custody.
If there is any doubt as to its meaning it is completely dispelled by the remainder of the section which states that in
case of s1wh appeal defendant shall not be discharged from
custody where the judgment of conviction has become final
pending the appeal; however, defendant may be admitted to
bail pending the appeal. If ''discharge'' is not limited to a
release from custody these provisions in the section become
meaningless.
Aside from the question of appealability I cannot agree with
the majority opinion on the merits. While it is difficult to
ascertain precisely what the holding is, the result is a comreversal of the judgment. That reversal seems to be
prrdicated upon the ground that because petitioner was given
the facilities to which the order said he was entitled the
q nestion has become moot. In reaching that conclusion the
majority ignores the fact that the evidence supports the order
of the superior court in that the conduct of the prison
authorities was such that it could at least be inferred that they
would continue to withhold the facilities from petitioner unless a court ordered otherwise. It is similar to a case in which
an injunction is sought, and there is a showing of threatened
injury by defendant, but after the injunction is ordered he
says he will be a "good boy." His belated repentance furnishes no basis for reversing the judgment granting the

12
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injunction. 'l'he
to decide the
question anew in spite of its
on appeal by the
conclusion of the trial court on
evidence.
The evidence shows that the
authorities delayed for
14 days in permitting petitioner to have ace.ess to the courts;
that despite the advice of the attorney
petitioner was
deprived of such access; that
was deprived of his
personal books and papers and
from working on his
case; indeed, this is admitted
the warden and he insisted
on his right to do so; that the warden refused to permit petitioner to consult with an
whom petitioner had requested to call at the prison and consult with him and the
warden testified that if petitioner asked to see that attorney
again, "I am not prepared to say whether or not we would
approve it.'' All of these things justified the superior court
in concluding that there existed a real danger that the prison
authorities would continue to deny the rights to which petitioner was entitled. It is of little significance that at the time
of the hearing petitioner was not being deprived of his rights.
That constituted nothing more than a conflict in the evidence
on the question of what the warden's future conduct would be.
Or it might be vievved as a confession that they had been
wrong in their action and, in effect, a stipulation that the
order made by the trial court should be made. Judicial protection of the rights of a prisoner would indeed be a mockery
if the courts would always accept the pious protestations of
the prison authorities that the rights would be accorded and
then blithely disregard them the next day, leaving the prisoner
to commence again his weary journey through the court
process toward a chimerical goal. Such conditions are intolerable in a civilized society, yet this court now espouses them.
In mandamus proceedings it has been held that the writ
is proper where the conduct of the officers indicates they do
not intend to perform their duty. In Imperial Mut. L. Ins. Co.
v. Caminetti, 59 Cal..App.2d 494, 497 [139 P.2d 693], the
court said: "[T]he general rule is that the act sought to be
compelled by mandamus must be one to the performance of
which the party is entitled at the time the proceeding in
mandate is instituted . . . but that rule is subject to a
kindred rule that mandate may be resorted to when it appears
from the conduct or declarations of the officer or board, that
they do not intend to comply with their obligation . . . when
the time for such action arrives. . . . To insist in an equitable
proceeding such as mandate is, and under the facts and cir-
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cumstances here
that
should have been
compelled to file a
for renewal of its license for the
few days between June 15th and June 30th, 1941, and then,
subsequent to July
file another petition for the ensuing
fiscal year ending J nne 30, 1942, would do violence to the rule
enunciated in section 3532 of the Civil Code, which reads 'The
law neither docs nor
idle acts.' Equity will also
consider the fact that there is no showing of prejudice to
appellant commissioner
reason of the time when the action
herein was filed . . . . Equity does not look with favor upon
litigation by piece-meal, and whenever possible will dispose
of the entire controversy between the parties, will grant complete relief and whenever possible will settle and determine
all differences between the parties in the one action, leaving
nothing for further litigation between the same parties and
upon the same subject-matter.''
·with reference to injunctions the rule has been stated to
be : "However, the mere cessation by defendant of the alleged
acts or conduct, before or after the beginning of a suit for
injunction, has been held not a bar to the issuance of an
injunction, and in a proper case, as where there is a reasonable
ground to believe that there will be a resumption of such
activities, a court of equity may issue an injunction." ( 43
C.J.S., Injunctions,§ 22(d); see also Boggs v. North American
Bond etc. Co., 6 Cal.2d 523 [58 P.2d 918].)
The rights assured to petitioner by the order of the superior
court are important and any impairment thereof must be
c·arefully scrutinized. It is said in Ex parte H7tll, 312 U.S.
546, 549 [61 S.Ct. 640, 85 L.Ecl. 1034]: "[T]he state and its
officers may not abridge or impair petitioner's right to apply
to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. vVhether a
petition for writ of habeas corpus addressed to a federal court
is properly drawn and what allegations it must contain are
questiolls for that court alone to determine.'' The court said
in In t'e R1'der., 50 Cal.App. 797, 799 [195 P. 965]: "The right
of an accused, confined in jail or other place of detention
. . . to have an opportunity to consult freely with his counsel
·without any third person, ·whose presence is objectionable
to the accused, being present to hear what passes between
the accused and his counsel, is one of the fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Amerie:m criminal law-a right that no
legislature or court can ignore or violate. In this state, the
right of an accused to consult with his counsel is guaranteed
by the constitution, which, in section 13 of article I, expressly
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whatdeclares that 'in criminal
ever, the party accused shall have the
. appear
and
in person and with counsel.' rrhis clause of the
constitution unquestionably was
to secure to the
accused person all the benefits which may fimv from thP
employment of counsd to conduct his defense. To afford him
those benefits it is essential that he should
allowed to
consult with his
not only
the actual
but prior
in order to prepare for his defense. The
privilege of the presence of counsel upon the trial would be
poor concession if the right of consultation with such
counsel prior to the trial were denied. It is
essential
that the
to the enjoyment of this constitutional
accused should have the right to a
consultation with
his counsel. As said by the Oklahoma criminal court of appeals, 'It would be a cheap subterfuge of and a senseless
mockery upon justice for the state to put a man on trial
in its courts, charged with an offense which involved his life,
liberty, or character, and then place him in such a position
that he could not prepare to make his defense. It would be
just as reasonable to place shackles upon a man's limbs, and
then tell him that it is his right and duty to defend himself
against an impending physical assault. If the right of defense
exists, it includes and carries \Yith it the right of such freedom
of action as is essential and necessary to make such defense
complete. In fact, there can be no such thing as a legal
trial, unless both parties are allowed a reasonable opportunity
to prepare to vindicate their rights . . . . It therefore necescharged
C'arily follows that it is the absolute right of
with crime to confer privately with their attorneys, and that
it is an illegal abridgment of this right for a sheriff, jailer,
or other officer to deny to a defendant the right to commit
his attorneys except in the presence of such officer . . . . It
is the duty of officers having the custody of persons charged
with crime to afford them a reasonable opportunity to privately consult with their attorneys, without having other
persons present, taking such precautions as may be necessary,
according to the circumstances of each case, to prevent the
escape of such prisoner.'" (See also In re Robinson, 112 Cal.
App.2d 626 [246 P.2c1 982].) There is no basis whatsoever
for the statement in the majority opinion that petitioner is
seeking or sought or was granted ''special privileges.'' 'l'he
rights sought by petitioner and granted by the trial court are
the rights which must be accorded to all prisoners if the
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of " ual
under law" is to have any signifiwhatever.
The
states that prisoners have a right to prompt
and
access
the mails "for the purpose of transmitto the courts'' facts which show ground for relief but
"have no legal1.v cnforrcAblr rights to engAgr in legal
research.'' :B~or that conclusion it cites the code sections to
is
dead. What bearing that
on a
to defend himself dors not appear.
If he may transmit "facts" to the courts in an attempt to
obtain r01 ief he should also be entitled to transmit legal
To do either reqnires reasonable opportunity
to prepare the faets and the law.
If that requires legal
rrseareh then a reasonable opportunity therrfor should be
The order of the trial eourt here did not go bryond
the bounds of reason. Certainly it cannot be said its order
is so unreasonable that it abused its discretion.
The majority deeision here is another, in a long line of
decisions by this court, in whieh this petitioner has been
denied his constitutional rights. (See People v. Chessman,
:56 Cal.2d 455 [218 P.2d 769, 19 A.hR.2d 1084]; People v.
Chessman. 38 Cal.2d 166 [238 P.2d 1001] ; In re Chessman,
4;l Ca1.2d 408 [274 P.2d 645] .)
I wonld affirm the order here under review.
The application of respondent on appeal in Grim. No. 559]
Heal I'Rrty in l ntercst in S. F. No. 19158 for a rehearing
\Yas denied Mareh :3, lf)i).). Carter. ,J.. and Traynor, .T., wen'
of the opinion that the applieation should be granted.

